Facebook Libra is Architecturally Unsound

Coming out of blogging retirement with a post that diverges from my usual nerdy pursuits about Haskelling and maths. I’ve spent the last few years working on financial technology in the EU and I felt it was appropriate to write on what I see as a undercovered topic in tech journalism.

In the last few months Facebook has released what they claim is a new financial services platform called Libra. Libra aims to be digital settlement system based on a basket of international currencies that are managed on a “blockchain” and held in a cash pool governed in Switzerland. The stated goals of the project are lofty and have massive geopolitical consequences.

There are many sensible articles written in the Financial Times and New York Times about the unsound monetary and economic assumptions that underlie the proposed financial structure, but there aren’t enough technologists who have given their analysis from a technical perspective. Not many people who work on financial infrastructure speak publicly about their work and so this project has gotten quite a bit of a pass in tech journalism. Financial journalism really needs to do their due diligence on this project as the internals are exposed for the world to see. For reference I am referring to the code is open sourced at this Github repository and under the Calibra Organisation.

What is laid bare for the world to see is an architecturally schizophrenic code artifact claiming to be a new reliable platform for global payment infrastructure. Yet the actual implementation diverges from this goal in bizarre ways when one actually dives into the codebase. I’m sure there is an interesting story about the internal corporate politics of this project and as such I thought it apt to do some diligence on what I see as a truly strange set of architectural choices that break the entire system and put consumers at risk.

There is another technical review of this architecture from mcclure111 which comes to similar conclusion about the apparent faux-innovation and mental gymnastics this project does to pretend to be a decentralised blockchain when it’s actually just a slow replicated database for shadow banking.

I won’t pretend to have an objective opinion about Facebook as a company. Few people in tech view the company in a positive light anymore. Reading through the publications released, it is clear there is a fundamental deception in the stated goal and implementation of the project. Put concisely, this project will not empower anyone. It is a pivot from a company whose advertising business is so embroiled in scandal and corruption that it has no choice but to try to diversify into payments and credit scoring to survive. The clear long term goal is to act as a data broker and mediate consumers access to credit based on their private social media data. This is such an utterly terrifying and dystopian story that should cause more alarm than it does.

The only saving grace of this story is the artifact they open sourced is so hilariously unsuited for the task they set out to do it can only be regarded as an act of hubris. There are several core architectural errors in this project:

Libra’s byzantine tolerance on a permissioned network is an incoherent design.

Byzantine fault tolerance is a fairly niche area of distributed systems research that concerns the ability of a networked system to endure arbitrary failures of its components while taking corrective actions critical to the system’s operation. Networks that are byzantine tolerant must resist several types of attacks including restarts, crashes, malicious payloads, and malicious voting in leader elections. This design decision is central to Libra and it makes zero sense.

The time complexity overhead from this additional structure varies based on algorithms. There is a wide amount of literature where Paxos and Raft derivative algorithms that have been enriched with Byzantine tolerant features but all of these structures come with an additional communication overhead on top of the \(O(n^2)\) communication cost to maintain the quorum. The algorithm chosen by Libra still has a worst-case \(O(n^2)\) communication cost in the case of leadership failure. And occurs additional overhead from potential leadership reelections on several types of network failure events.

For a system that is designed to be run in a consortia of highly regulated multinational corporates, all running Facebook signed code and access controlled by Facebook it simply makes no sense to deal with malicious actors at the consensus level. Why is this system designed to be byzantine tolerant at all rather than just maintaining a consistent audit log for compliance checks. The possibility that a Libra node run by Mastercard or Andressen Horrowitz would suddenly start running malicious code is such a bizarre scenario to plan for and is better solved by simply enforcing protocol integrity and through non-technical (i.e. legal) means.

In congressional testimony the product was stated as a challenger to emerging international payment protocols such as WeChat, Alipay and M-Pesa. Yet none of these systems are designed to run on byzantine tolerant pools of validators. They are simply designed in the traditional high-throughput bus that orders ledger transactions according to a fixed set of rules. This is the natural approach to designing a payment system. Preventing double-spends and forks is simply not an issue that a properly designed payment rails should ever have to deal with by design.

The overhead from the consensus algorithm serves no purpose and will only limit throughput of the whole system, and appears to be there here no reason other than apparently cargo culting public blockchain technology which is not designed for this use case.

Libra has no transaction privacy.

By the admission of the whitepaper the system is designed to be pseudononymous meaning the addresses used at the protocol are derived from elliptic curve public keys and contain no metadata about the accounts. Yet nowhere in the governance structure description for the organisation or the protocol itself does it indicate how the economic data involved in transactions would be obscured from the validators. The system is designed to be a very large way of replicating transactions to a number of external parties who under existing European and US bank secrecy laws should not be privy to the economic details.

Data policies are difficult to coordinate across borders, especially with disparate laws and regulations across jurisdictions having differing cultural views on data protection and privacy. The protocol itself is completely open to consortia members by default which is a clear technical design deficiency unsuited to meet the requirements it was designed for.

Libra HotStuff BFT is not capable of achieving the throughput necessary for a payment rail.

In the United Kingdom clearing systems like BACs are capable of clearing something on the order of 580,000,000 transactions a month. While highly tuned systems like Visa are capable of achieving 150,000,000 transactions a day. The performance of these systems is a function of the size of transactions, network routing, system load and AML (anti-money laundering) checks.

For domestic transfers, the efficiency problems that Libra tries to solve, aren’t really problems in nation states which have modernised their clearing infrastructure in the last decade. For retail consumers in the European Union, moving money is simply a non-issue. It can be done simply with a standard smartphone in seconds with traditional infrastructure. For large corporate treasury department there are different mechanisms and regulations involved for moving large quantities of money.

There is no technical reason that cross border payments could also not settle instantly, except for the differences in rules and requirements across the jurisdictions involved. If the required preventive measures (customer due diligence, sanctions screening, etc) are completed multiple times at different steps in the transaction chain this can delay the transaction. Nevertheless, this delay is purely a function of the governing law and compliance rather than the technology.

For consumers there is no reason why a transaction in the United Kingdom won’t clear in seconds. For retail transactions in the EU, they are really only rate-limited by KYC (know your customer) and AML constraints imposed by governments and regulators which would equally apply to Libra payments. Even if Facebook were to overcome the hurdles on international money and private data movement, the model as proposed is hundreds of person-years away from being able to handle global transaction throughput and would likely have to be completely redesigned from first principles.

Libra’s Move language is not sound.

The whitepaper makes a bold set of claims about a new untested language called Move which are quite dubious from a programming language theory (PLT) perspective.

“Move” is a new programming language for implementing custom transaction logic and “smart contracts” on the Libra Blockchain. Because of Libra’s goal to one day serve billions of people, Move is designed with safety and security as the highest priorities.

The key feature of Move is the ability to define custom resource types with semantics inspired by linear logic

In the public blockchains, smart contracts refer to logic deployed on public networks which allows escrowing, laundering money, and the issuance of extralegal securities and gambling products. These are typically done in a shockingly badly designed language called Solidity, which from an academic PL perspective, makes PHP look like a work of genius. Oddly the new language designed by Facebook seems to have no use case in common with these technologies as it is effectively a scripting language designed for unclear corporate use cases.

In private distributed ledgers, smart contracts are one of those terms that are thrown around by consultants without much regard for clear definitions or purpose. Enterprise software consultants generally thrive on ambiguity and smart contracts are the apotheosis of enterprise obscurantism because they can be defined to mean literally anything.

On the nature of it’s alleged safety we have to look at the language’s semantics. Soudness in PLT generally consists of two different proofs called “progress” and “preservation” which determine the consistency of the whole space of evaluation rules for the language. More concretely, in type theory a function is “linear” if it consumes its argument exactly once and is “affine” if it consumes it at most once. A linear type system gives a static guarantee that a claimed linear function really is linear by prescribing types to all of functions subexpressions and tracking call sites. This is a subtle property to prove and requires quite a bit of machinery to do for whole program analysis. Linear typing is still a very academic research area that has inspired uniqueness typing in Clean and ownership typing in Rust. There are some tentative proposals for adding linear types to Glasgow Haskell Compiler.

The claim of the Move language to use of linear types appears to be unsubstantiated by a dive into the compiler as it reveals no such typechecker logic. As far as one can tell the whitepaper cites the canonical literature from Girard and Pierce and does nothing of the sort in the actual implementation.

On top of this, the formal semantics of the supposedly safe language are nowhere to be found in either the implementation or the paper. The language is small enough that a full correctness proof of the semantics in Coq or Isabelle is tractable. Indeed, an end to end compiler which did a full proof-carrying transformation down to bytecode is quite viable using modern toolchains invented in the last decade. We’ve known how to do this since the work of George Necula and Peter Lee all the way back in 1996.

From a programming language theory perspective the claim that Move is sound and secure is impossible to answer as the claims seem to reduce to nothing more than handwaving and marketing rather than actual proof. This is an alarming position for a language engineering project which expects the public to trust it to handle billions of dollars.

Libra’s cryptography engineering is unsound.

Building sound cryptosystems is a very difficult engineering problem and a healthy dose of paranoia around cryptography is always the healthy attitude when dealing with dangerous code. There are major leaps forward in this space like the Microsoft Everest project building a verifiably secure TLS stack. The tools to build verifiable primitives exist today and while expensive to do, are certainly not outside the economic capacity of Facebook to build. Yet the team has chosen not to on a project stated to be reliable for global finance.

The libra project depends on several fairly new “wild west” libraries for building experimental cryptosystems that have only emerged in the last few years. It is impossible to say whether the dependencies on the following tools are secure or not as none of these libraries have had security audits nor do they have standard practice disclosure policies. Several core libraries in particular are indeterminate about their vulnerabilities to side channel and timing attacks.

  1. ed25519-dalek
  2. curve25519-dalek

The library gets even more experimental and ventures quite outside the Cryptography Standard Model by folding in very novel techniques like verifiable random functions, bilinear pairings and threshold signatures. These techniques and libraries might be sound, but the amalgamation of all of them into one system should raise some serious concerns about attack surface area. The combination of all of these new tools and techniques makes the burden of proof much higher.

It should be assumed this entire crypto stack is vulnerable to a variety of attacks until proven otherwise. The “move fast and break things” model should not apply to cryptographic tools handling consumer financial data.

Libra has no capacity for consumer protection mechanisms.

A defining feature of a payment rail is the ability to reverse transaction in case payments need to be undone by legal action or if they result in accidental or system malfunction. The Libra system is designed to have “total finality” and does not include a transaction type to reverse a payment. In the United Kingdom all payments between £100 and £30,000 are governed Consumer Credit Act. This means the payment provider has equal responsibility and liability with the seller if there’s a problem with the items bought or the payee fails to render services. There are similar regulations across EU, Asia and North America.

The current Libra design includes no protocol to comply with consumer protection laws and has no clear plan to build one. Even worse, from an data architecture the finality of the core authenticated data structure based on a Merkle accumulator state admits no mechanism to build this into the core ledger without a redesign of the core.


The final conclusion one must take away after doing technical due diligence on this project is this simply that it would not pass muster in any respected journal on distributed systems research or financial engineering. Before trying to disrupt global monetary policy there is a massive amount of a technical work needed to build a reliable network the public and regulators could trust to securely handle user data.

I see no reason to believe that Facebook has done the technical work needed to overcome these technical issues in their project, not does it have any technical advantage over existing infrastructure that already works. Claiming one’s company needs regulatory flexibility to explore innovation is not an excuse for not doing it in the first place.